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From the early days of mandatory arbitration of statutory 
claims—especially employment-discrimination claims—one major 
critique has been the loss of transparency and publicity that attends a 
shift from litigation in public courts to arbitration in private 
tribunals.1 Given the lack of written, publicly available decisions and 
the relative secrecy of arbitral proceedings, the diversion of legal 
disputes from courts to arbitrators under the Federal Arbitration Act 
(“FAA”)2 threatens to stunt both the development of the law and 
public knowledge of how the law is interpreted and applied in 
important arenas of public policy. 
Judith Resnik and others have shown that the presumed contrast 
to litigation was in some ways overstated as litigation itself has 
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 1. See Bryant G. Garth, Privatization and the New Market for Disputes: A 
Framework for Analysis and a Preliminary Assessment, 12 STUD. L. POL. & SOC’Y 367, 
378–83 (1992); Katherine Van Wezel Stone,	Mandatory	Arbitration	of Individual 
Employment Rights: The Yellow Dog Contracts of the 1990s, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 1017, 
1047 (1996). 
 2. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2012). 
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dramatically receded from the public stage.3 Public trials in civil cases 
have become nearly extinct, as the overwhelming majority of cases 
are resolved either on dispositive motions (usually in unpublished 
opinions) or out-of-court settlements. Settlements between private 
parties often include non-disclosure provisions barring parties from 
discussing anything about the case or its resolution.4 
While it is important not to overstate the contrast between 
arbitration and litigation, there is no doubt that much more of the 
arbitral process is shielded from public view. In particular, the 
plaintiff’s allegations are set out in a complaint that appears on a 
public docket in litigation but not in arbitration, and the hearing, if 
any, occurs in open court in the case of litigation but usually in a 
private conference room in the case of arbitration.5 In cases that 
proceed through a hearing and decision, the typically terse nature of 
arbitral rulings means that much of the actual rationale for the 
decision is hidden inside the arbitrator’s head—and even these terse 
rulings are rarely published.6 The relative secrecy of arbitration is a 
product partly of the confidentiality norms that prevail within this 
private contractual forum and the community of arbitrators,7 and 
partly of confidentiality agreements that often accompany pre-dispute 
arbitration agreements and that bind the parties.8 The private and 
contractual nature of arbitration makes it relatively easy for firms to 
 
 3. See Judith Resnik, Diffusing Disputes: The Public in the Private of Arbitration, the 
Private in Courts, and the Erasure of Rights, 124 YALE L.J. 2804, 2932–33 (2015) 
[hereinafter Resnik, Diffusing Disputes] (quoting JUD. CONF. U.S., LONG RANGE PLAN 
FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS 19–20 (1995), http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts
/FederalCourts/Publications/FederalCourtsLongRangePlan.pdf [http://perma.cc/WEY3-
9U0q]); Judith Resnik, Courts: In and Out of Sight, Site, and Cite, 53 VILL. L. REV. 771, 
810 (2008). Among others elaborating similar views, see Howard M. Erichson, Foreword: 
Reflections on the Adjudication-Settlement Divide, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1117, 1123 
(2009); Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters 
in Federal Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 459–60 (2004); David Luban, 
Settlements and the Erosion of the Public Realm, 83 GEO. L.J. 2619, 2629–32 (1995). 
 4. See, e.g., Joseph F. Anderson, Jr., Hidden from the Public by Order of the Court: 
The Case Against Government-Enforced Secrecy, 55 S.C. L. REV. 711, 715 (2004). 
 5. KATHERINE V.W. STONE & ALEXANDER J.S. COLVIN, ECON. POLICY INST., THE 
ARBITRATION EPIDEMIC 5 (2015), http://www.epi.org/files/2015/arbitration-epidemic.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/M65J-JXNT] (describing differences between arbitration and court 
proceedings). 
 6. See id. 
 7. For example, staff of the American Arbitration Association (“AAA”)—the 
country’s largest providers of arbitration services—have an ethical obligation to keep 
information confidential. AAA Statement of Ethical Principles, AM. ARB. ASS’N, 
https://www.adr.org/StatementofEthicalPrinciples [https://perma.cc/2E4A-EAZL]. 
 8. Laurie Kratky Doré, Public Courts Versus Private Justice: It’s Time to Let Some 
Sun Shine in on Alternative Dispute Resolution, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 463, 466 (2006). 
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prevent disclosure of just about anything concerning allegations, 
evidence, disposition, or settlement of the disputes, not just by parties 
but by the tribunals themselves. 
To the extent that firms do impose obligations on their 
employees (and customers) to arbitrate rather than litigate future 
legal disputes, they can often draw a heavy veil of secrecy around 
allegations of misconduct and their resolution. That means that firms 
have less to worry about if they violate the law. They face more 
limited “reputational sanctions,” which are among the most powerful 
deterrents to illegal or legally questionable conduct, at least among 
reputable firms.9 The relative invisibility of particular disputes and 
their outcomes in arbitration thus undermines the regulatory function 
of private-enforcement actions, which serve not only as a dispute 
resolution mechanism but also as an ex post alternative or 
supplement to ex ante prescriptive rules of conduct.10 
The relative secrecy and obscurity of arbitral proceedings 
extends to the nature of arbitral procedures themselves. Courts follow 
published rules of procedure that are promulgated by publicly 
accountable bodies. Arbitrators are primarily bound by the 
agreements under which they are appointed—agreements that are 
written by the parties, or rather by one party in the case of most 
employment and consumer arbitration agreements.11 Some 
arbitration instruments adopt the procedures of reputable arbitration 
providers like the American Arbitration Association (“AAA”);12 
others use more obscure providers or invent their own procedures.13 
Either way, firms have no legal obligation to make their chosen 
procedures publicly available.14 That has made it impossible to 
develop an accurate empirical assessment of the shape of mandatory 
arbitration as a mechanism of dispute resolution and has greatly 
handicapped efforts to hold firms publicly accountable for the fairness 
of their dispute resolution procedures. 
 
 9. See generally Roy Shapira, Reputation Through Litigation: How the Legal System 
Shapes Behavior by Producing Information, 91 WASH. L. REV. 1193 (2016) (exploring the 
impact of litigation on reputational sanctions). 
 10. See Samuel Issacharoff, Regulating After the Fact, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 377, 385–86 
(2007). 
 11. See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 681–84 (2010). 
 12. STONE & COLVIN, supra note 5, at 17. 
 13. Id. 
 14. See id. at 18. On why that is problematic and why transparency should be 
mandated (both for firms’ chosen arbitration procedures and for other terms and 
conditions of employment), see generally Cynthia Estlund, Just the Facts: The Case for 
Workplace Transparency, 63 STAN. L. REV. 351 (2011). 
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In this Article, I focus on another dimension of the obscurity 
surrounding mandatory arbitration: the outright disappearance of 
claims that are subject to this process. The secrecy and non-
transparency of arbitration providers and procedures greatly impeded 
empirical research on arbitration, its incidence, and its outcomes for 
decades after the Supreme Court launched the mandatory-arbitration 
juggernaut. But the picture is gradually coming into focus. It now 
appears that the great bulk of disputes that are subject to mandatory 
arbitration agreements (“MAAs”)—that is, a large share of all legal 
disputes between individuals (consumers and employees) and 
corporations—simply evaporate before they are even filed. It is one 
thing to know that mandatory arbitration draws a thick veil of secrecy 
over cases that are subject to that process. It is quite another to find 
that almost nothing lies behind that veil. Mandatory arbitration is less 
of an “alternative dispute resolution” mechanism than it is a 
magician’s disappearing trick or a mirage. Metaphors beckon, but I 
have opted for that of the black hole into which matter collapses and 
no light escapes. 
The paucity of employment claims in arbitration has not gone 
unnoticed by scholars. Alexander Colvin and his co-authors, who 
have conducted much of the empirical work on arbitration of 
employment disputes, have noted the strikingly small number of 
arbitration filings.15 Jean Sternlight in particular has surveyed the 
literature and data on this point and elaborated the implications for 
employee rights.16 I highlight and elaborate on these findings here 
because their implications are profound, and they deserve more 
attention than they have gotten so far. 
A word on the scope of this Article: first, the focus here is on 
employment disputes. Although mandatory arbitration has probably 
had a greater proportional impact on consumer claims (largely by way 
of anti-class action provisions), employment claims are distinctive in 
ways that matter here. Employment cases, with the exception of 
wage-and-hour claims, are much more likely than consumer claims to 
involve individual disputes with significant financial stakes for 
 
 15. See Alexander J.S. Colvin, An Empirical Study of Employment Arbitration: Case 
Outcomes and Processes, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 1, 6 (2011). 
 16. See Jean R. Sternlight, Disarming Employees: How American Employers Are 
Using Mandatory Arbitration to Deprive Workers of Legal Protection, 80 BROOK. L. REV. 
1309, 1328–29 (2015). Judith Resnick and Maria Glover have also highlighted the paucity 
of arbitrations in both employment and consumer cases and the implications for access to 
justice. See J. Maria Glover, Arbitration, Transparency, and Privatization: Disappearing 
Claims and the Erosion of Substantive Law, 124 YALE L.J. 3052, 3091–92 (2015); Resnik, 
Diffusing Disputes, supra note 3, at 2936. 
96 N.C. L. REV. 679 (2018) 
2018] MANDATORY ARBITRATION 683 
individual claimants (relative to their total resources). The prevalence 
of fee-shifting provisions in many employment statutes17 attests to the 
recognized importance of both the public interests at stake and of 
private enforcement in vindicating those public interests.18 For 
present purposes, it is also important that employment litigation has 
long been and continues to be a major part of federal court dockets.19 
Although the use of arbitration agreements has sharply increased in 
recent years, many employees remain free to file their claims in 
court.20 That makes it possible to compare some aspects of litigation 
and arbitration that might otherwise remain obscure.21 
Within the field of employment arbitration, this Article focuses 
on employer-promulgated pre-dispute arbitration agreements in the 
non-union workplace; that is what is meant here by “mandatory 
arbitration.” Arbitration under individually negotiated agreements 
(mainly for high-salaried employees) or under either post-dispute 
agreements to arbitrate or collective bargaining agreements is 
different, and more likely to be a mutually beneficial alternative to 
either litigation or labor-management strife. But arbitration that is 
imposed on employees as a condition of employment before any 
dispute has arisen, which is the focus of this Article, has been 
deservedly controversial since its inception. 
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I briefly reviews the 
decades-long quest for empirical data on mandatory-employment 
arbitration and highlights the small number of arbitrations that take 
place under these provisions. Part II develops some rough estimates 
of the number of “missing claims”—potential claims that are subject 
to arbitration but never enter any adjudicatory process. Part III 
explores some dimensions of the causal story behind why so few 
claims are filed in arbitration. Part IV turns to the consequences of 
the missing claims for enforcement of employee rights. Part V 
concludes with a plea to reconsider the law of mandatory arbitration 
 
 17. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C §	216(b) (2012); 42 U.S.C. §	2000e-5(k). 
 18. See, e.g., Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 401–02 (1968) (per 
curiam) (noting that Congress enacted a fee-shifting provision to help individuals advance 
important policy goals by pursuing private remedies). These features are all found most 
clearly in cases alleging discriminatory or retaliatory discharge, which make up a large 
share of employment litigation. In wage-and-hour disputes, individual stakes are typically 
smaller, and cases are often not viable without collective adjudication, as with most 
consumer claims. 
 19. See infra note 70 and accompanying text. 
 20. See infra notes 61–63 and accompanying text. 
 21. There are still many difficulties with comparing data on arbitration and litigation. 
Sternlight, supra note 16, at 1325. Those difficulties are greatest in relation to data on 
outcomes. This Article focuses more narrowly on initial filings. 
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in light of mounting evidence that it effectively enables employers to 
nullify employee rights and to insulate themselves from the liabilities 
that back up crucial public policies. 
I.  THE LONG QUEST FOR DATA ON MANDATORY ARBITRATION 
Federal courts keep public records of lawsuits and filings, and 
some basic information about types of cases. Based on that data and 
other information about the disposition of cases, scholars have long 
been producing empirical studies of litigation.22 (Data from state 
courts is far more difficult to gather or assess.)23 The information is 
limited, but the federal courts are exemplars of transparency 
compared to the world of arbitration. While federal law routinely 
consigns federal statutory claims to private arbitration pursuant to 
mandatory pre-dispute “agreements” imposed as a condition of 
employment, it does not require either employers or arbitration 
providers to publish any information about the agreements, the 
procedures, or the cases thus resolved.24 Moreover, nothing in the 
burgeoning law of arbitration under the FAA, despite its impact on 
the enforcement of important public policies, regulates what entities 
may provide arbitration. Apart from concerns about the fairness of 
these decision-making processes, the lack of regulation and 
transparency has made it very difficult for scholars to assemble data 
about the aggregate dimensions or consequences of arbitration in 
employment (or consumer) cases.25 
The largest arbitration providers are well-established, reputable 
organizations like the American Arbitration Association and the 
Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Service (“JAMS”).26 Survey data 
 
 22. For examples in the employment discrimination field, see generally Kevin M. 
Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs in Federal Court: 
From Bad to Worse?, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 103 (2009); Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart 
J. Schwab,	How Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs Fare in Federal Court, 1 J. 
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD.	429 (2004); John J. Donohue III & Peter 
Siegelman,	The	Changing Nature of Employment Discrimination Litigation, 43 STAN. L. 
REV. 983 (1991). 
 23. Sternlight, supra note 16, at 1324–25. 
 24. See Estlund, supra note 14, at 355. Some state laws (including in California) 
require arbitration providers to publicize certain information about the consumer and 
employment cases they handle; although compliance with these laws varies, the resulting 
data has greatly improved the empirical study of arbitration. Id. 
 25. Lisa Blomgren Amsler, Combating Structural Bias in Dispute System Designs that 
Use Arbitration: Transparency, The Universal Sanitizer, 6 Y.B. ON ARB. & MEDIATION 32, 
42–43 (2014); Sternlight, supra note 16, at 1323–24. 
 26. See ALEXANDER J.S. COLVIN & MARK D. GOUGH, COMPARING MANDATORY 
ARBITRATION AND LITIGATION: ACCESS, PROCESS, AND OUTCOMES 34 (2014), 
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indicate that the AAA is designated in about half of employment 
arbitration agreements, and JAMS in another twenty percent.27 Both 
organizations provide lists of qualified arbitrators and are relatively 
transparent in how arbitrators are chosen, who they are, and how they 
deal with disputes (though both organizations also promote 
confidentiality in the proceedings themselves).28 Both the AAA and 
JAMS also adhere to the much-touted “Due Process Protocol” 
(“DPP”), a set of standards for fair employment arbitration 
procedures that was approved by a diverse group representing 
employers, unions, employees, and dispute resolution professionals.29 
But nothing in the law of arbitration requires arbitration providers to 
adhere to the DPP, and nothing requires employers to designate the 
AAA or JAMS as the arbitration provider. 
An estimated thirty percent of arbitration provisions call for 
adjudication of disputes through other providers or ad hoc 
processes.30 In this grey zone, arbitration procedures, the pool of 
arbitrators, the selection process, and case outcomes may all be 
impossible for outside observers to ascertain. It appears that some of 
those providers succumb to the temptation to supply what some firms 
demand, and cater quite openly to the employers who unilaterally 
draft and impose arbitration agreements and who choose the 
providers. For example, consider the egregiously one-sided 
agreement struck down by the Fourth Circuit in Hooters of America, 
Inc. v. Phillips,31 which, among its many defects, essentially 
guaranteed that the employer would choose the arbitrator.32 But it 




 27. Id. at 34–35. 
 28. JUDICIAL ARBITRATION & MEDIATION SERV., JAMS COMPREHENSIVE 
ARBITRATION RULES & PROCEDURES 16–18, 28 (2014), https://www.jamsadr.com/files
/uploads/documents/jams-rules/jams_comprehensive_arbitration_rules-2014.pdf [https://perma.cc
/8ELD-9VV5]; AM. ARB. ASS’N, supra note 7. 
 29. See Richard A. Bales, The Employment Due Process Protocol at Ten: Twenty 
Unresolved Issues, and a Focus on Conflicts of Interest, 21 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 
165, 174 (2005); see also AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, EMPLOYMENT DUE PROCESS 
PROTOCOL 1–5 (1995), https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/document_repository
/Employment%20Due%20Process%20Protocol_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/C6M4-5CW8]. 
 30. See COLVIN & GOUGH, supra note 26, at 35 fig. 23. 
 31. 173 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1999). 
 32. Id. at 938–39 (“[T]he employee’s arbitrator and the third arbitrator must 
be	selected from a list of arbitrators created exclusively by Hooters. This gives Hooters 
control over the entire panel and places no limits whatsoever	on whom Hooters can put on 
the list.”). 
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of “choosing” arbitration and arbitration providers would put 
pressure on the neutrality of the process. 
A 2015 front page New York Times series pierced the veil of 
secrecy to expose the partiality of arbitration in practice—even 
among some AAA and JAMS arbitrators.33 Among the “subtler” 
forms of partiality was “the case of the arbitrator who went to a 
basketball game with the company’s lawyers the night before the 
proceedings began. (The company won.)”34 In another case, “a 
dismayed [plaintiff] watched the arbitrator and defense lawyer return 
in matching silver sports cars after going to lunch together. (He 
lost.)”35 Part of the problem is the so-called “repeat player effect,” or 
the tendency of arbitrators to favor the party that is more likely to 
produce repeat business.36 The Times reporters found that, out of the 
cases they examined, “41 arbitrators each handled 10 or more cases 
for one company between 2010 and 2014.”37 One “JAMS arbitrator in 
an employment case	.	.	. simultaneously had 28 other cases involving 
the [defendant] company.”38 As for the impact of this fact, in 
interviews, “more than three dozen arbitrators described how they 
felt beholden to companies. Beneath every decision, the arbitrators 
said, was the threat of losing business.”39 As for the employee-
complainants, one arbitrator said, “Why would an arbitrator cater to 
a person they will never see again?”40 The veil of secrecy that shields 
arbitration from public scrutiny and from all but the most persistent 
investigators has obscured these problems for decades. 
The opacity of the arbitration process translates into a paucity of 
empirical data on how mandatory arbitration works and how it has 
affected the enforcement of public laws. From 1992, when Gilmer v. 
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.41 launched the mandatory arbitration 
 
 33. See Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Michael Corkery, In Arbitration, a ‘Privatization 
of the Justice System,’ N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 1, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/02
/business/dealbook/in-arbitration-a-privatization-of-the-justice-system.html [https://perma.cc
/9UY4-3K3K (dark archive)]; Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Robert Gebeloff, Arbitration 
Everywhere, Stacking the Deck of Justice, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 31, 2015) 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/01/business/dealbook/arbitration-everywhere-stacking-the-
deck-of-justice.html [https://perma.cc/Z5WM-H8C2 (dark archive)]. 
 34. Silver-Greenberg & Corkery, supra note 33. 
 35. Id. 
 36. See Lisa B. Bingham, Employment Arbitration: The Repeat Player Effect, 1 EMP. 
RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 189, 190–91 (1999). 
 37. Silver-Greenberg & Corkery, supra note 33. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. 500 U.S. 20, 31 (1991). 
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juggernaut within the field of statutory employment claims, until 
about 2010, there was little representative data on any aspect of 
arbitration under those employer-devised procedures.42 The early 
data that did exist came disproportionately from individually 
negotiated arbitration agreements (typically involving high-level 
executives).43 
Based on the partial early data, some commentators reached a 
conclusion that was quite consistent with the Gilmer Court’s sanguine 
account of the quid pro quo of mandatory arbitration: By agreeing to 
arbitrate, parties trade “the procedures and opportunity for review of 
the courtroom for the simplicity, informality, and expedition of 
arbitration.”44 Plaintiffs, for their part, lost access to juries, judges, 
and appellate review, but gained access to a faster and often cheaper 
adjudication process.45 Based on that early data, Professor Samuel 
Estreicher and others concluded that arbitration had some 
advantages for both sides over the expensive and “lottery-like” 
litigation process; recoveries were more limited, but employees—
especially low-income employees—were more likely to get some kind 
of hearing and more likely to get some kind of remedy.46 On that 
then-plausible account, the advent of mandatory arbitration appeared 
likely to enhance ordinary employees’ access to justice. 
The picture has become a bit clearer in recent years, due in part 
to a handful of state laws, including California’s, requiring arbitration 
providers to publicly disclose a modicum of information about the 
disputes they handle.47 In addition the AAA has allowed some 
scholars to examine case files, under assurances of confidentiality, and 
to publish some aggregate data.48 The comparatively rich body of 
empirical research that has emerged in recent years is still far from 
 
 42. See Colvin, supra note 15, at 11 tbl.2. 
 43. See id. at 5. 
 44. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 31 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-
Plymouth, 472 U.S. 614, 628 (1985)). 
 45. See Samuel Estreicher, Saturns for Rickshaws: The Stakes in the Debate Over 
Predispute Employment Arbitration Agreements, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL., 559, 
563–64 (2001). 
 46. See id.; Lewis L. Maltby, Private Justice: Employment Arbitration and Civil Rights, 
30 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 29, 30 (1998); David Sherwyn et al., In Defense of 
Mandatory Arbitration of Employment Disputes: Saving the Baby, Tossing out the Bath 
Water and Constructing a New Sink in the Process, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 73, 148 
(1999); Theodore J. St. Antoine, ADR in Labor and Employment Law During the Past 
Quarter Century, 25 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 411, 417–18 (2010). 
 47. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §	1281.96 (West, Westlaw through ch. 2 of 2018 Reg. 
Sess.). 
 48. See Alexander J.S. Colvin, Mandatory Arbitration and Inequality of Justice in 
Employment, 35 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 71, 79–82 (2014). 
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comprehensive. It is also likely to overstate the fairness of arbitration 
for claimant-employees because the data comes from arbitration 
providers who comply with state-disclosure requirements (many do 
not),49 and especially from the AAA, which has supported scholarly 
efforts to understand the operation and impact of arbitration.50 
With that in mind, it is striking how discouraging the more recent 
data are. It now appears not only that average recoveries are 
significantly lower in arbitration than in court (as previously 
believed), but also that employee-complainants may be significantly 
less likely to prevail and to recover anything.51 Colvin and Gough, for 
example, found that employees won something in 19.1% of AAA 
arbitrations that were terminated from 2003 to 2013.52 That compares 
to the findings of other scholars that plaintiffs won something in 
29.7% of federal employment discrimination cases,53 57% of state 
non-civil rights employment cases, and 59% of California state 
wrongful discharge cases.54 Moreover, employees who did win 
something recovered much less in AAA arbitration than in litigation: 
The median award was $36,500 in arbitration versus $176,426 in 
federal discrimination cases, $85,560 in state non-civil rights 
employment cases, and $355,843 in California wrongful discharge 
cases.55 Still, data on case outcomes are hotly contested, and their 
 
 49. See David J. Jung et al., PUB. LAW RES. INST., REPORTING CONSUMER 
ARBITRATION DATA IN CALIFORNIA 3 (2013), http://gov.uchastings.edu/docs/arbitration-
report/2014-arbitration-update [https://perma.cc/UZ46-FX6K]. 
 50. Colvin and Gough, for example, were able to examine AAA files, under promises 
of confidentiality, to examine case outcomes and characteristics. Alexander J.D. Colvin & 
Mark D. Gough, Individual Employment Rights Arbitration in the United States: Actors 
and Outcomes, 68 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 1019, 1019 (2015). 
 51. Data on outcomes are difficult to gather and to interpret, particularly in light of 
high rates of settlement, about which information is especially scarce. So there is still 
considerable debate about these matters. See, e.g., Samuel Estreicher, Michael Heise & 
David S. Sherwyn, Evaluating Employment Arbitration: A Call for Better Empirical 
Research, 70 RUTGERS U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 16) (on file with the 
North Carolina Law Review) (comparing and critiquing various studies on outcomes in 
arbitration and litigation). 
 52. Colvin & Gough, supra note 50, at 1028 tbl.1. Looking at more recent data, 
Professor Estreicher, Heise, and Sherwyn found an employee win rate of 22.4% in cases 
resulting in an award. Estreicher et al. supra note 51 (manuscript at 10). 
 53. See Theodore Eisenberg, Four Decades of Federal Civil Rights Litigation, 12 J. 
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 4, 28 (2015). 
 54. See David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Verdicts Matter: An Empirical Study of 
California Employment Discrimination and Wrongful Discharge Jury Verdicts Reveals 
Low Success Rates for Women and Minorities, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 511, 535 (2003). 
 55. Colvin, supra note 48, at 80. 
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meaning is clouded by high rates of dismissal and summary judgment 
in court and by the paucity of data on settlements.56  
My focus here, however, is not on outcomes in arbitration versus 
litigation, but on the sheer number of cases in each. The single most 
striking fact uncovered by the recent studies is the very small number 
of arbitration cases that enter the process. During the eleven-year 
period from 2003 through 2013, an average of about 940 cases per 
year were filed and terminated with the AAA under employer-
promulgated procedures.57 If the AAA is the designated provider in 
about half of arbitration agreements (as surveys suggest),58 that yields 
an estimate of fewer than 2000 employment arbitration cases 
terminated per year under MAAs.59 At first glance, that appears to be 
a very low number. Let us dig in a bit to see how low it is (in Part II) 
and to begin to understand why it might be so low (in Part III).60 
II.  COUNTING “MISSING” ARBITRATION CASES 
To assess the meaning of the small number of arbitrations, we 
might start by comparing that number with the number of employees 
covered by MAAs. Until recently, the prevailing scholarly estimate 
was that those agreements covered roughly twenty percent of non-
union private sector employees.61 (That compared to just over two 
percent coverage in 1992.62) By contrast, Colvin’s more 
comprehensive 2017 study estimated that 56 percent of non-union 
private sector employees, or approximately 60 million employees, are 
now covered by MAAs.63 That is a steep increase in coverage, and it 
sharply raises the stakes in debates over mandatory arbitration. But 
of course those numbers beg the question: How many such 
 
 56. See Estreicher et al., supra note 51 (manuscript at 10–11). 
 57. Colvin & Gough, supra note 50, at 1027. 
 58. See COLVIN & GOUGH, supra note 26, at 34–35. 
 59. In theory, there could be a larger, though hidden trove of arbitrations conducted 
by non-AAA providers. But the opposite is more probable: Claimants are probably much 
less likely to file claims with non-AAA providers, many of which are less reputable and 
less committed to treating claimants fairly. See infra text accompanying note 78–79. 
 60. Again, let me note that Jean Sternlight has reported on these matters in greater 
detail than I do here. See Sternlight, supra note 16, at 1332. 
 61. This estimate was based on Colvin’s 2007 studies of the telecommunications 
industry, in which he found that fifteen to twenty-five percent of employees were covered 
by arbitration agreements. Alexander J.S. Colvin, Empirical Research on Employment 
Arbitration: Clarity Amidst the Sound and Fury?, 11 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 405, 410–
11 (2007). 
 62. ALEXANDER J.S. COLVIN, ECON. POLICY INST., THE GROWING USE OF 
MANDATORY ARBITRATION 4 (2017), http://www.epi.org/files/pdf/135056.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/VCG8-37UU]. 
 63. Id. at 2. 
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individuals each year have potential employment law claims—claims 
that proceed past “naming” and “blaming” to “claiming” in some 
forum or another?64 
I will focus here solely on the number of claims filed (whether or 
not they are terminated), as that will allow for a relatively clean 
comparison with federal court filing statistics, and will avoid many 
controversies surrounding the analysis of case outcomes. I will focus 
on filings in 2016, the most recent year for which solid data are 
available for both the AAA and federal courts.65 The AAA reports 
that 2879 individuals filed employment cases with the AAA under 
employer-promulgated procedures in 2016.66 Following the 
provisional assumption above that this represents half of all 
arbitrations under MAAs,67 that suggests that about 5126 cases were 
filed in arbitration by the approximately 60 million employees who 
are covered by MAAs. That appears to represent an increase above 
what Colvin found, on average, from 2003 to 2013, and that is what 
one would expect given his recent findings on growing use of 
MAAs.68 Still, it seems like a very low number. But to make sense of 
it, one needs to know how many claims were filed in court by those 
free to do so. That might make it possible to roughly estimate the 
number of claims one would expect to see among those covered by 
MAAs.69 
 
 64. The iconic terminology is from William L.F. Felstiner, Richard L. Abel & Austin 
Sarat, The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming .	.	. , 15 
LAW & SOC’Y REV. 631, 631 (1980). 
 65. I use a single year’s data in part because of Colvin’s 2017 study showing that 
coverage of MAAs has risen steeply in recent years. COLVIN, supra note 62, at 1. In earlier 
years, fewer workers were presumably covered by MAAs, but there is no data on 
coverage. Insofar as the coverage percentage is a key element of the analysis below, I use 
only the most recent year for which data on court and arbitration are available. 
 66. Email from Ryan Boyle, Vice President, Statistics and In-House Research, to 
author (Oct. 24, 2017) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). Between 2012 and 
2016, an average of 2563 cases per year were filed under employer promulgated 
procedures. Id. The AAA reports one filing per individual, even if multiple individuals are 
covered by the same complaint. See Consumer Arbitration Statistics, AM. ARB. ASS’N, 
https://www.adr.org/ConsumerArbitrationStatistics [https://perma.cc/N2MJ-YRW4]. 
 67. See supra notes 58–60 and accompanying text. I will question that assumption 
below. 
 68. See supra text accompanying notes 57–64. Note, too, that my 2016 data are on 
filings, while Colvin’s numbers above from 2003–2013 are for cases filed and terminated. 
 69. One caveat to this comparison stems from the fact that some unknown number of 
individuals (mostly high-income professional or managerial employees) are covered not by 
employer-promulgated procedures (what I call MAAs here) but rather by individually-
negotiated arbitration agreements. Those individuals are not included in Colvin’s estimate 
of 56% coverage by MAAs, and arbitrations under those agreements are not included in 
the AAA numbers reported here. See Alexander Colvin & Kell Pike, Saturns and 
Rickshaws Revisited: What Kind of Employment Arbitration System has Developed?, 29 
96 N.C. L. REV. 679 (2018) 
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Let us begin with federal court litigation, as to which data are 
readily available. In 2016, approximately 31,000 federal lawsuits were 
filed in five categories of employment cases: “Civil rights: 
employment,” “ADA [Americans with Disabilities 
Act]/employment,” “FLSA” (Fair Labor Standards Act), “ERISA” 
(Employee Retirement Income Security Act), and “FMLA” (Family 
and Medical Leave Act).70 If those 31,000 federal court cases were all 
filed by the 44 percent of employees who are not covered by MAAs, 
then we would expect over 39,000 claims to be filed in arbitration by 
the other 56 percent of employees who are subject to mandatory 
arbitration.71 Given the preliminary estimate of 5,126 arbitration 
filings,72 this comparison would suggest about 34,000 “missing” 
arbitrations per year—that is, 34,000 cases that we would expect to 
enter the arbitration process, based on the general rate of 
employment litigation and the number of employees covered by 
MAAs, but that are never filed. 
That is a striking number of “missing” arbitrations. But these 
numbers are open to several objections, two of which may call for 
downward adjustments, and are reflected in Figure 1. First, some 
federal court lawsuits are filed by public employees, who are not 
generally subject to MAAs and should be excluded from the 
comparison. If government employees (who make up 15.2% of non-
farm employees) are as likely as private sector employees to file an 
employment lawsuit in federal court, the relevant number of federal 
court filings would fall to 26,300.73 Second, some of the federal court 
lawsuits were presumably filed by individuals who were covered by 
 
OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 59, 63–66 (2014). In terms of actual arbitrations, the numbers 
are small; in 2008, for example, 27.6% of the AAA’s employment arbitration docket (124 
out of 449 cases) arose out of individually-negotiated agreements. Id. Ignoring those cases 
might introduce some small distortion into the comparison between rates of litigation and 
of arbitration. I have tried to take this problem into account below. See infra note 79. 
 70. U.S. District Courts—Civil Cases Commenced, by Nature of Suit, During the 12-
Month Periods Ending September 30, 2012 Through 2016, U.S. COURTS, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/jb_c2a_0930.2016.pdf [https://perma.cc
/8428-MMJ5]. 
 71. That is: (56 ÷ 44) x 31,000. It is more likely that the federal court numbers includes 
some claims that are covered by MAAs. That is taken into account below, see infra note 
74. 
 72. See supra text accompanying note 67. 
 73. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, 15.2% of non-farm employees work 
for the government at some level. Current Labor Statistics, BUREAU OF LABOR 
STATISTICS (Sept. 2017), https://www.bls.gov/web/empsit/ceseeb1a.htm [https://perma.cc
/6SA9-H23W]. 
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MAAs (and thus faced a motion to compel arbitration).74 In the 
absence of any data on this point, Figure 1 shows a range of expected 
arbitration claims, with the top number reflecting the assumption that 
no claims covered by MAAs were initially filed in federal court, and 
the bottom number reflecting the assumption that all such claims 
were initially filed in federal court.75 These two adjustments lead to an 
estimate of “expected” arbitrations between 14,70076 and 33,500,77 as 
compared to the 5,126 arbitrations that appear to have been filed, and 
to an estimate of between 9600 and 28,400 “missing” arbitrations. 
 
 
Figure 1: An Initial Estimate of “Missing” Employment Claims 
in Arbitration (2016) 
 
In several respects, however, the Figure 1 estimate of “missing 
arbitrations” is far too conservative. To begin with, the estimate of 
arbitrations filed is almost certainly too high. It assumes that 
employee-plaintiffs are equally likely to file a claim whether they are 
covered by AAA- or non-AAA-administered arbitrations. Given that 
many of the latter do not abide by the DPP, and that some are 
 
 74. Plaintiffs and their attorneys are not always aware of the existence of an MAA 
until after filing a lawsuit. See Mark D. Gough, Employment Lawyers and Mandatory 
Arbitration: Facilitating or Forestalling Access to Justice?, in 22 MANAGING & RESOLVING 
WORKPLACE CONFLICT 105, 124 (David B. Lipsky, Ariel C. Avgar, & J. Ryan Lamare 
eds., 2016). 
 75. In the latter (extremely unlikely) event, the federal claims (26,300) would 
represent 100% of all claims, and 56% of those claims (about 14,700) would be relegated 
to arbitration. 
 76. See supra note 75. 
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Actual - arbitration
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employer-controlled,78 it seems probable (and my conversations with 
plaintiffs’ attorneys and other experts suggest) that employee-
plaintiffs are much less likely to file a claim if they are subject to a 
non-AAA-administered arbitration. If that is so, then a more realistic 
estimate of arbitration cases filed in 2016 might be 4000 or less. 
Nonetheless, I have left the higher estimate of 5126 in place in Figure 
2 below.79 
At the same time, the number of court filings in Figure 1 is 
certainly too low. First, it takes no account of employment litigation 
in state court; that would include employee claims resting on state 
common law or statutory grounds, and those that plaintiffs choose to 
file in state court because the forum is viewed as friendlier. In the 
most populous state of California, for example, plaintiffs’ attorneys 
rarely choose to file employment actions in federal court.80 Second, 
some of the federal lawsuits (as well as some of the excluded state 
lawsuits) are class or collective actions, some of which might cover 
hundreds of employees or more. By contrast, employees covered by 
MAAs are usually precluded from pursuing their claims as a group.81 
On the first point, the volume of employment litigation in state 
courts is notoriously difficult to pin down.82 However, Professor Mark 
Gough, drawing on two large studies of state court litigation, has 
developed a rough estimate of 195,000 employment lawsuits per year 
in state courts of general jurisdiction.83 That estimate is based on 
 
 78. Cf. COLVIN & GOUGH, supra note 26, at 34. 
 79. I do so partly because of the lack of data on non-AAA arbitrations, and partly in 
order to offset any potential distortion that might be attributed to the exclusion of 
arbitrations under individually-negotiated arbitration agreements. See supra note 69. 
 80. See Sternlight, supra note 16, at 1332 n. 143 (citing GARY BLASI & JOSEPH W. 
DOHERTY, UCLA LAW-RAND CTR. FOR LAW & PUB. POLICY, CALIFORNIA 
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW AND ITS ENFORCEMENT: THE FAIR EMPLOYMENT 
AND HOUSING ACT AT 50, at 11 (2010)). 
 81. Colvin’s 2017 survey showed that thirty percent of MAAs contained such a clause. 
COLVIN, supra note 62, at 3. Because larger employers were more likely to have such a 
clause in their MAAs, that suggests that forty-one percent of employees covered by 
MAAs, and twenty-three percent of all employees, were expressly barred from filing or 
participating in a class or collective action. Id. For agreements that are silent about class 
claims, however, the Supreme Court’s decision in Stolt-Nielsen v. AnimalFeeds 
International Corp. holds that silence regarding class arbitration implies lack of party 
consent, and thus precludes class arbitration. 559 U.S. 662, 687 (2010). 
 82. See Sternlight, supra note 16, at 1325 nn.99–100. 
 83. See email from Mark D. Gough, Assistant Professor, Penn State Coll. of Liberal 
Arts, to author (Nov. 30, 2017) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). Gough used 
the most recent (2013) data from the National Center for State Courts (“NCSC”) showing 
that over 5.9 million civil cases were filed in state courts of general jurisdiction. See NAT’L 
CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS: AN OVERVIEW 
OF 2013 STATE COURT CASELOADS (2015), http://www.courtstatistics.org/~/media
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some untested (though plausible) assumptions, as Gough recognizes.84 
But it is more likely to understate than to overstate the volume of 
state employment litigation given that it still excludes cases from five 
jurisdictions, including California, which together account for 
eighteen percent of the national population.85 All in all, including 
Gough’s estimate of 195,000 state cases is likely to yield a more 
realistic estimate of total employment lawsuits, and a more realistic 
estimate of “missing” arbitration cases.86 
The second point relates to a legal controversy over the status of 
aggregate employment claims in arbitration that is currently before 
the Supreme Court.87 The National Labor Relations Board 
(“NLRB”) held in D.R. Horton, Inc.,88 that employers violate the 
National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”) in seeking employees’ 
waiver of the right to bring collective legal claims of any kind: Section 
7 of the NLRA protects employees’ right to engage in “concerted 
 
/microsites/files/csp/ewsc_csp_2015.ashx [https://perma.cc/G2QL-VG8R]. Gough then 
used the Civil Justice Survey of State Courts (“CJSSC”) finding that 3.3% of civil verdicts 
in 2005 were in employment disputes. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL BENCH AND 
JURY TRIALS IN STATE COURTS, 2005 STATISTICS 2 tbl.1 (2008) https://www.bjs.gov
/content/pub/pdf/cbjtsc05.pdf [https://perma.cc/EFA4-QZRL]. 
 84. The resulting estimate of 194,700 employment cases is based on two assumptions: 
that employment cases represented the same percentage of filings as of verdicts; and that 
this percentage has held steady since 2005. In Gough’s view (and mine), both assumptions 
are reasonable though unproven. Any overestimate of employment cases is likely to be 
offset by the uncounted cases from California and five other jurisdictions, which are still 
excluded. See infra note 85. 
 85. The excluded jurisdictions are California, Illinois, Idaho, Minnesota, and the 
District of Columbia (plus Puerto Rico). They are excluded from the NCSC data that 
Gough relied on because they have “single-tiered” court systems, which take in enormous 
numbers of cases (such as traffic violations) that go to courts of limited jurisdiction in the 
included jurisdictions. I calculated the populations using 2016 Census data. See Annual 
Estimates of the Resident Population: April 1, 2010 to July 1, 2016, 2016 Population 
Estimates, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Dec. 2016), https://factfinder.census.gov/faces
/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?src=bkmk [https://perma.cc/6Z3N-JNE4]. 
 86. It should be noted that some cases might be filed in state court but then removed 
to federal court; they might thus be counted twice in state and federal court statistics. That 
is especially likely for class actions given the removal provisions of the Class Action 
Fairness Act. See 28 U.S.C. §§	1332(d), 1453, 1711–15 (2012). But given the severe 
undercount of class actions overall, and the omission of cases from California in state 
statistics, see infra note 85, I do not believe the potential double-counting problem is 
significant. 
 87. The Court granted certiorari and consolidated three decisions: Lewis v. Epic Sys. 
Corp, 823 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 2016), cert. granted, 137 S.Ct. 809 (2017); Morris v. Ernst & 
Young, LLP, 834 F.3d 975 (9th Cir. 2016), cert. granted, 137 S.Ct. 809 (2017); and NLRB v. 
Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 808 F.3d 1013 (5th Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 137 S.Ct. 809 (2017). 
 88. 357 N.L.R.B. 2277 (2012), enforcement denied in part, 737 F.3d 344, 364 (5th Cir. 
2013). 
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activities for	.	.	. mutual aid or protection,”89 and that has long been 
held to include employees’ collective pursuit of legal claims through 
courts or otherwise.90 According to the NLRB, the fact that such a 
waiver is part of an arbitration agreement does not make it 
enforceable under the FAA.91 Given a split among the courts of 
appeals,92 the Supreme Court has agreed to decide the matter. 
The problem for employees is that some legal claims cannot 
practicably be adjudicated on an individual basis. In particular, many 
FLSA wage and hour claims involve incremental pay disparities over 
a few years; the cost of litigating them as an individual often exceeds 
the expected returns.93 But if many individuals are subject to the same 
challenged practice, as is often true, employees can practicably pursue 
their claims through a class or collective action.94 If employers have 
their way in the Supreme Court, they will be free to block all such 
actions, and to virtually nullify a large category of employee claims 
that are not viable on an individual basis, simply by requiring 
individual arbitration. This is a point to which I will return in Part V. 
For present purposes, however, the point is simpler and less 
controversial: Given the existence of class and collective claims in 
court (but not in arbitration), any count of court cases, including the 
number of federal cases in Figure 1, greatly understates the number 
of individuals whose claims are encompassed by those filings. 
Some useful data exist in one category of cases: lawsuits under 
the FLSA filed in federal court (8686 cases in 2016). A recent law 
firm report asserts that nearly all FLSA lawsuits in the past several 
 
 89. 29 U.S.C. §	157. 
 90. D.R. Horton Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. at 2278. 
 91. Id. at 2287. 
 92. Compare Epic Sys., 823 F.3d at 1147 (upholding the NLRB view) and Ernst & 
Young, 834 F.3d 975 at 975, 990 (same) and NLRB v. Alternative Entertainment, Inc., 858 
F.3d 393, 408, No. 16-1385 (6th Cir. 2017) (same), with Cellular Sales of Mo., LLC v. 
NLRB, 824 F.3d 772, 776 (8th Cir. 2016) (rejecting the NLRB view) and Murphy Oil, 808 
F.3d at 1015 (rejecting NLRB view) and Sutherland v. Ernst & Young LLP, 726 F.3d 290, 
299 (2d Cir. 2013) (same). 
 93. See Cynthia L. Estlund, Between Rights and Contract: Arbitration Agreements and 
Non-Compete Covenants as a Hybrid Form of Employment Law, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 379, 
427–29 (2006). 
 94. A “collective action” under the FLSA allows many similarly situated individuals 
to join in a single lawsuit, and thus to litigate more efficiently than through multiple 
individual lawsuits; yet this form of group litigation lacks many of the advantages of class 
actions, and particularly of “opt-out” actions under Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure. See generally Craig Becker & Paul Strauss, Representing Low-Wage 
Workers in the Absence of a Class: The Peculiar Case of Section 16 of the Fair Labor 
Standards Act and the Underenforcement of Minimum Labor Standards, 92 U. MINN. L. 
REV. 1317 (2008) (chronicling the difficulties of collective FLSA actions as compared to 
class actions). 
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years were filed as class or collective actions.95 Let us assume, more 
conservatively, that 7000 of those 8686 FLSA actions were aggregate 
actions,96 and that each of those covered, on average, fifty 
individuals.97 That would yield an additional 350,000 claims in federal 
court—that is, 350,000 individuals who would stand some chance of 
recovering something as a result of group litigation. Figure 2 reflects 
that adjustment, as well as Gough’s partial estimate of 195,000 
additional employment claims filed in state court. Those additions to 
the Figure 1 estimate of 26,300 federal lawsuits bring the estimated 
total number of employment claims encompassed by court filings to 
571,300. 
As Figure 2 illustrates, the resulting estimate of total 
employment claims filed in court leads to a striking estimate of 
“expected” claims in arbitration: If MAA-covered employees were as 
willing and able to arbitrate their claims as non-MAA-covered 
employees are willing and able to litigate, then we would expect to 
see between 320,000 and 727,000 employment claims in arbitration 
(depending again on how many of the claims encompassed by court 
filings were covered by MAAs).98 Given the estimated 5126 claims 
actually filed in arbitration, that suggests an estimated 315,000 to 
722,000 “missing” arbitration cases. Stated differently, well under two 
percent of the employment claims that one would expect to find in 







 95. See SEYFARTH SHAW LLP, 13TH ANNUAL WORKPLACE CLASS ACTION 
LITIGATION REPORT 20 (2017), https://www.workplaceclassaction.com/wp-content
/uploads/sites/214/2017/01/CAR-2017-Chapter-1-FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/92KB-HXYX]. 
 96. For the total number of FLSA actions (8686), see U.S. COURTS, supra note 70, at 
tbl.C-2A. The estimate of 7000 FLSA aggregate actions is conservative relative to the 
Seyfarth Shaw report contending that “[v]irtually all” FLSA claims are filed as class or 
collective actions. See SEYFARTH SHAW LLP, supra note 95, at 20. 
 97. Fifty claims per aggregate action is meant to be a conservative estimate; compare 
to Professor Sternlight’s estimate of 500 individuals per group claim. Sternlight, supra note 
16 at 1337. If fifty seems high, consider that other class and collective actions, such as those 
under employment discrimination laws and all of those filed in state court, are not taken 
into account at all. 
 98. See supra text accompanying notes 75–77 (explaining the rationale behind the top 
and bottom of this range). 
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Figure 2: An Estimate of “Missing” Employment Claims in 
Arbitration (including those encompassed by aggregate FLSA 
claims) (2016) 
 
By graphically representing these estimates, I do not intend to 
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highlight the jaw-dropping disparities in estimated filing rates 
between court and arbitration, which are large enough, I would argue, 
to swamp any quibbles about precise numbers. And that is despite the 
omission of state court litigation in California and several other 
jurisdictions, as well as many claims encompassed by class or 
collective actions. Given those omissions, Figure 2 probably 
understates the number of claims encompassed by court filings, and 
thus the number of claims one would hypothetically expect to be filed 
in arbitration if it were a comparably accessible and hospitable forum. 
All in all, the available evidence suggests that the overwhelming 
majority of claims that would have been litigated but for the presence 
of a MAA are simply dropped without being filed in any forum at all. 
Before turning to the reasons for the paucity of arbitration cases, 
let us take note of two possible but unquantifiable explanations for at 
least part of the disparity shown above. First, it is possible that 
employers that impose MAAs are systematically different from those 
that do not, and less likely to generate claims. We do know that larger 
and more sophisticated employers are more likely to use MAAs.99 If 
those larger employers are less likely to violate the law and to 
generate employee claims, then one would expect fewer claims from 
employees covered by MAAs than the “expected” numbers 
generated above. On the other hand, it would not be surprising if the 
obscure netherworld of employer-dominated arbitration attracted 
some less scrupulous employers seeking to immunize themselves from 
liabilities. Nor would it be surprising if employers who jumped on the 
mandatory arbitration bandwagon in the wake of AT&T Mobility 
LLC v. Concepcion100 and American Express Co. v. Italian Colors 
Restaurant,101 and who might have been motivated chiefly by the 
prospect of foreclosing all group claims, are a less scrupulous bunch 
than the early adopters, and perhaps less scrupulous than the average 
employer. Either of those surmises might lead one to expect more 
disputes arising among employees covered by MAAs than the 
“expected” numbers above. I know of no data pointing either way, 
but these possibilities cloud the meaning of the “missing” arbitration 
cases, and qualify what follows. 
It is also important to recognize that employee claims can be 
resolved before they are filed in any forum, and that this might be 
more likely for claims that are subject to mandatory arbitration than 
 
 99. See COLVIN, supra note 62, at 5. 
 100. 563 U.S. 333 (2011).  
 101. 570 U.S. 228 (2013). 
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for those that are not.102 Some employers use mandatory arbitration 
as the final stage in a structured alternative dispute resolution 
(“ADR”) process.103 Those processes typically call for formal or 
informal mediation, as well as confidential meetings with 
ombudsmen, before any arbitration.104 At least in the first decade or 
so after Gilmer, employers that used mandatory arbitration were 
considerably more likely to have robust internal-grievance 
procedures.105 To the extent that remains true, it suggests that the 
resolution of arbitrable claims before they are formally filed—
through mediation, for example—might account for some of the 
“missing claims” estimated above. On the other hand, it is possible 
that later adopters of MAAs, and especially those drawn in by the 
ability to block group claims, were less likely than the early adopters 
to embed arbitration within a structured dispute resolution process. 
All in all, it seems unlikely that this difference—a higher rate of early 
dispute resolution among arbitrable claims—accounts for more than a 
fraction of the estimated “missing” arbitration cases. But it is surely 
one more source of uncertainty about the numbers. 
Much is still unknown about the fate of cases in arbitration (and 
litigation). From whatever angle one looks at the numbers, however, 
it appears that a very large majority of aggrieved individuals who face 
the prospect of mandatory arbitration give up their claims before 
filing. For all the sound and fury about skewed outcomes, repeat 
player effects, biased arbitrators, limited discovery, and lack of 
adherence to or production of precedent in arbitration,106 it turns out 
 
 102. I thank Professor David Sherwyn for highlighting this point. 
 103. See David Sherwyn et al., Assessing the Case for Employment Arbitration: A New 
Path for Empirical Research, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1557, 1581–91 (2005). 
 104. Id. at 1586. 
 105. Alexander J.S. Colvin, The Relationship Between Employment Arbitration and 
Workplace Dispute Resolution Procedures, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 643, 649 
(2001) (finding telecommunications industry employers that elected to use arbitration 
were more likely to also have structured ADR processes). Moreover, employees were 
more likely to bring grievances in workplaces that had such systems. Alexander J.S. 
Colvin, The Dual Transformation of Workplace Dispute Resolution, 42 INDUS. REL. 712, 
729 (2003) (finding peer-review and nonunion arbitration procedures had grievance rates 
that were, respectively, forty-three percent and sixty-eight percent higher than basic 
nonunion procedures). It is worth noting, however, that not all claims resolved via such 
grievance procedures are legally cognizable. See W. Mark C. Weidemaier, From Court-
Surrogate to Regulatory Tool: Re-framing the Empirical Study of Employment Arbitration, 
41 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 843, 849 n.14 (2008). 
 106. See, e.g., Bingham, supra note 36, at 190–91 (discussing repeat player effects); 
David S. Schwartz, Claim-Suppressing Arbitration: The New Rules, 87 IND. L.J. 239, 246 
(2012) (“If the arbitrator decides that the arbitration agreement is unenforceable, he loses 
income.”); Stone, supra note 1, at 1040 (discussing pro-employer outcomes in arbitration). 
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that, except for a relative handful of cases, arbitration does not take 
place at all.107 That is the black hole of mandatory arbitration. 
III.  ACCOUNTING FOR MISSING CASES: WHY SO FEW 
ARBITRATIONS? 
What happens to the claims that can be adjudicated only in 
arbitration but are never filed? Conjecture calls for caution. But let us 
bring some hypothetical plaintiffs’ attorneys into the story.108 And let 
us assume that those attorneys are rational actors with at least a 
rough idea of the law and empirics surrounding arbitration. After all, 
attorneys’ livelihood depends on their ability to calculate the 
probabilities and degrees of success, or risk-return ratios, in cases 
brought to them.109 Suppose now that they learn that a prospective 
client is subject to a mandatory arbitration agreement. What enters 
into their calculations in deciding whether to take a case? 
With or without an express anti-aggregation clause, they know 
that an MAA is likely to knock out some small value claims at the 
outset even if they are shared by hundreds or thousands of the 
complainant’s co-workers.110 The legality of those clauses is currently 
before the Supreme Court, as noted above,111 so let us focus on other 
legally questionable provisions the attorney might encounter, and that 
might impede the fair adjudication of otherwise viable individual 
claims. 
Attorneys at the intake point may or may not have access to a 
detailed written description of the arbitration process. If they do, they 
might find some provisions that would bar the claim altogether (like a 
very short limitations period or unaffordable arbitrator fees), or 
impede investigation (like very limited discovery), or sharply skew 
proceedings against the complainant (like a biased arbitrator pool or 
a skewed selection process), or curtail recovery even in the event of 
 
 107. Of course, that may be precisely because of the many discrete problems that have 
attracted critical attention; more on this below. 
 108. Although claimants can proceed in arbitration without legal representation—that 
was once thought to be an advantage of arbitration—it does not appear to be a very 
successful strategy. Colvin found that, for the 24.9% of employees who represented 
themselves, the win rate was 18.3% and the average award overall was $12,228, as 
compared to 22.9% win rate and $28,993 average award for represented claimants. Colvin, 
supra note 15, at 16. I note that the perspective of plaintiffs’ attorneys, as with much else in 
this Article, has been explored quite thoroughly by Professor Gough based on his survey 
of 1,256 employment plaintiff attorneys, Gough, supra note 74, and by Professor Sternlight 
in her article, Sternlight, supra note 16, at 1334–40. 
 109. For evidence that they do just that, see Gough, supra note 74, at 120–21. 
 110. See Estlund, supra note 93, at 427–30. 
 111. See supra note 87. 
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“success” (like provisions against attorney fee shifting or punitive 
damages, or damage limits). It hardly helps, of course, if the 
arbitration agreement is vague or silent about these matters. If 
attorneys do identify invalid or troublingly vague provisions, they 
know that a court challenge would be costly, and would almost 
certainly pour them back into the still-flawed arbitration process, 
whether or not the court recognizes the flaws in that process.112 
Let us underscore this point: Some “missing” or dropped cases 
are probably dropped because they would be subject to invalid 
arbitration provisions that nonetheless deter claims. The viable legal 
objections to arbitration are dwindling, especially under the Supreme 
Court’s decisions in Concepcion and Italian Colors, which sharply 
limited courts’ ability to police the fairness of arbitration agreements 
under either the state contract doctrine of unconscionability or the 
federal common law concept of “effective vindication” of statutory 
rights.113 But the doctrine appears to still make it possible to challenge 
arbitration provisions that, for example, preclude statutorily 
prescribed remedies (including attorney fees),114 skew the selection of 
arbitrators,115 or impose excessive arbitrator fees or other barriers to 
the arbitral forum.116 Unfortunately, even these standards of fairness 
are administered in a manner that undermines their efficacy. Most 
objections are relegated to the arbitral forum itself for case-by-case 
resolution (as in the case of excessive arbitrator fees);117 unfair 
provisions are likely to be struck or amended from an agreement 
rather than invalidating the agreement. As a result, firms get the 
benefit of the arbitration agreement despite any overreaching.118 That 
inevitably tempts unscrupulous firms to “go for it”—to include 
knowingly unfair or invalid provisions that are likely to discourage 
many complainants and their attorneys from pursuing a case at all, 
with little or no downside risk in case the overreach is detected and 
 
 112. Most alleged defects in the arbitral process must be adjudicated within that very 
process. See Schwartz, supra note 106, at 265. 
 113. See American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228, 235 (2013). 
 114. That appears to come within the narrowed Italian Colors exception to blanket 
enforceability of arbitration agreements: the exception “would certainly cover a provision 
.	.	. forbidding the assertion of certain statutory rights.” Id. at 236. 
 115. Or so one can hope. Some “arbitration agreements,” like the one invalidated in 
Hooters of America, Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 940 (4th Cir. 1999), arguably do not even 
qualify as “arbitration,” the essence of which is an impartial decision maker chosen by 
both sides. 
 116. “Perhaps” such a provision would be invalid, per Italian Colors, 570 U.S. at 236. 
 117. See Green Tree Fin. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 89–92 (2000). 
 118. See Estlund, supra note 93, at 405. 
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corrected.119 Legally objectionable arbitration clauses and procedures, 
as well as vague and indeterminate ones, can deter both litigation and 
arbitration, especially by plaintiffs in relatively small-dollar cases. 
Even if plaintiffs’ attorneys do not encounter (or can surmount 
or ignore) all these hurdles to a fair arbitration process, they 
presumably know that they are less likely to win anything, and thus 
recover any attorneys’ fees, and even less likely to win enough to 
make the odyssey worthwhile for the attorney or the client. In short, 
expected recoveries (including attorneys’ fees) in arbitration will 
often fall below some threshold of economic viability for attorneys. 
Even in cases with “smoking gun” evidence and scandalous facts that 
might have jolted a jury into a mega-bucks verdict or posed a risk of 
serious public opprobrium for the defendant firm, arbitration muffles 
or even eliminates those risks. 
With all of this in mind, does a rational attorney take the case? Is 
it even worth writing a demand letter seeking to settle such a claim? 
Would a demand letter have any credible threat behind it? From all 
that appears from the data, the answer to all those questions is 
“rarely.” 
Of course, litigation is no panacea for plaintiffs.120 Many 
potential employee-claimants who believe they have been wronged 
are still free to litigate their claims (if they have not already waived 
those claims on their way out of the job though a severance 
agreement).121 Yet most of them cannot get an attorney to represent 
them. Given plaintiffs’ bleak track record in court, experienced 
attorneys agree to represent only a tiny fraction of the prospective 
clients they see—only about ten percent, according to surveys of 
plaintiffs’ attorneys.122 For most claims, the risk-return ratio is 
apparently too low even in court. To be sure, many individuals who 
believe they have been wronged, and who seek legal advice, have very 
weak legal claims on either the facts or the law.123 Still, it looks as 
 
 119. Id. 
 120. See generally Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, Employment 
Discrimination Plaintiffs in Federal Court: From Bad to Worse?, 3 HARV. L. & POL. REV. 
103 (2009) (detailing how plaintiffs in employment cases struggle in litigation). 
 121. See Alfred W. Blumrosen et al., Downsizing and Employee Rights, 50 RUTGERS 
U. L. REV. 943, 948 (1998). 
 122. COLVIN & GOUGH, supra note 26, at 14–15. 
 123. That proposition is obviously difficult to document. But it is often repeated by 
judges and by lawyers for both plaintiffs and employers, even with regard to claims that 
are actually filed. For example, two management-side lawyers quote several federal judges 
who characterize some employment litigation as frivolous or not well-founded. See Jay W. 
Waks & Gregory R. Fidlon, Federal Judges Recognize Growing Trend of Dubious 
Workplace Discrimination Cases, N.Y. EMP. L. & PRAC., Mar. 2000, at 1–2, 
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though the presence of a mandatory arbitration provision 
dramatically reduces an employee’s chance of securing legal 
representation,124 as well as her chance of any kind of recovery, any 
kind of hearing, or any formal complaint being filed on her behalf. 
IV.  FROM CAUSES TO CONSEQUENCES: EMPLOYER EXCULPATION 
AND JUDICIAL ABDICATION 
If the imposition of mandatory arbitration means that the 
employer faces only a miniscule chance of ever confronting a formal 
legal claim in any forum regarding future legal misconduct against its 
employees, then such a provision virtually amounts to an ex ante 
exculpatory clause, and an ex ante waiver of substantive rights that 
the law declares non-waivable.125 Let me explain. 
Nearly all statutory rights and most common law rights of 
employees are non-waivable or inalienable: An employee who is 
covered by the minimum wage law cannot make a valid agreement to 
waive its protections and to accept a lower wage; nor can she agree to 
waive the protections of antidiscrimination laws and to be subject to 
discrimination.126 Scholars debate the wisdom of non-waivable 
employee rights, with the usual face-off between market enthusiasts 
and market skeptics.127 But that normative debate should not distract 
from the point that, as a matter of positive law, most employee rights 
are not waivable ex ante. Of course, once claims arise, they can be 
settled or given up, even before any actual disputation, as with a 




 124. More than half of plaintiffs’ attorneys reported in a large survey that the presence 
of an arbitration provision tends to discourage them from accepting a case (even relative 
to the low percentage of cases they accept in general). Gough, supra note 74, at 121–22. 
Given the tiny number of arbitrations actually filed, these self-reports probably understate 
the actual impact of arbitration provisions on filing behavior. Indeed, Gough found that, in 
addition to those attorneys who reported that they were more likely to reject cases 
because of an arbitration clause as such, others acknowledged that lower expected 
recoveries in arbitration did affect their decisions. Id. 
 125. The essentials of this argument are developed in Estlund, supra note 93, at 427–30. 
 126. See id. at 380. 
 127. On the pro-contract side, see RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF 
LAW 358–59 (5th ed. 1998); Richard A. Epstein, In	Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 947, 982 (1984); Mayer G. Freed & Daniel D. Polsby,	Just Cause for 
Termination Rules and Economic Efficiency, 38 EMORY L.J. 1097, 1131–37 (1989). For just 
two examples of the contract-skeptics, see Michael H. Gottesman,	Wither Goest Labor 
Law: Law and Economics in the Workplace, 100 YALE L.J. 2767, 2787 (1991) and Clyde 
W. Summers, Individual Protection Against Unjust Dismissal: Time for a Statute, 62 VA. L. 
REV. 481, 482–83 (1976). 
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employment in exchange for a severance payment beyond what is 
contractually due.128 But the relevant rights and liabilities cannot be 
waived ex ante. 
Imagine now that an employer required employees, as a 
condition of employment, to agree that any disputes that arise out of 
the employment, including claims of discrimination or other 
violations of statutory rights, must be submitted to the company 
president for a final and binding decision. That agreement would 
presumably be void, for contracting ex ante into a one-sided or sham 
process of adjudication—one that offers no fair opportunity to 
vindicate one’s rights—is equivalent to a waiver of the underlying 
rights. 
Obviously, mandatory arbitration is not supposed to be that. It is 
supposed to be, and in principle could be, a fair alternative process 
for the adjudication of disputes. Under the Court’s very broad 
reading of the FAA, the right to litigate future disputes over non-
waivable substantive rights is itself waivable, but only in exchange for 
an alternative process for the adjudication of disputes by an impartial 
decision maker in which all substantive rights are preserved.129 But 
unless the alternative arbitral process does in fact allows for fair and 
impartial adjudication, and for the “effective vindication” of 
substantive rights, then a mandatory arbitration provision amounts to 
an ex ante waiver of those rights. 
The condition of “effective vindication” of rights is what ensures 
that “arbitration remains a real, not faux, method of dispute 
resolution	.	.	.	. Without it, companies have every incentive to draft 
their agreements to extract backdoor waivers of statutory rights.”130 
Unfortunately, that compelling language comes from Justice Kagan’s 
powerful dissent in Italian Colors. Until that ruling, the Court’s FAA 
decisions appeared to require an opportunity for “effective 
 
 128. Ordinarily such a waiver must be “knowing and voluntary.” 29 U.S.C. §	626(f)(1) 
(2012). Under the Older Workers’ Benefits Protection Act (“OWBPA”), a valid waiver of 
an existing ADEA claim must be “in exchange for consideration in addition to anything of 
value to which the [employee] already is entitled,” such as normal severance pay, and it 
must be preceded by disclosure of information about the triggering event and sufficient 
time to consult with an attorney, among other requirements. Id. 
 129. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991). I have argued 
elsewhere that, under the FAA, the right to litigate over non-waivable substantive rights is 
only “conditionally waivable”—it is waivable in favor of a fundamentally fair arbitration 
process—rather than fully or unconditionally waivable; and that is because unconstrained 
waiver of the right to litigate would amount to a waiver of the underlying rights. Estlund, 
supra note 93, at 409. 
 130. American Express Co v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228, 244 (2013) (Kagan, J., 
dissenting). 
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vindication” of substantive rights through arbitration.131 Italian Colors 
was deeply unsettling in two ways: At a minimum, the decision 
diluted the meaning of “effective vindication.” For the majority, an 
arbitration provision does not prevent “effective vindication” unless it 
actually blocks access to the arbitral forum (like an unreasonably high 
arbitrator’s fee) or explicitly denies substantive rights.132 On that 
formalistic view, a provision that makes adjudication economically 
infeasible (like a bar against aggregation of “negative value” claims) 
does not prevent “effective vindication” of rights.133 Even more 
disturbing, the Court in Italian Colors seems to have demoted 
“effective vindication” from a fixed principle guiding the assessment 
of arbitral fairness to something like dicta.134 If mandatory arbitration 
is not held to the standard of “effective vindication,” then it will 
devolve into—if it is not already—a mechanism for employers’ 
unilateral dissolution of inalienable substantive rights. 
Until recently, the piecemeal nature of the challenges to 
mandatory arbitration agreements and the paucity of data had 
obscured the cumulative impact of the Court’s decisions and of the 
many ways employers can tilt the process in their favor. Since the 
early decisions expanding the reach of mandatory arbitration (Gilmer 
and Circuit City Stores v. Adams135 in the employment context), the 
challenges to arbitration have mostly proceeded one by one: Does 
one particular provision prevent fair adjudication of claims? The 
Court, often by narrow majorities, has rejected most of those 
challenges and relegated nearly all of the challenges that it has 
recognized in principle to the arbitral forum itself. Each of those 
rulings might be defended given the law and norms of arbitration that 
had evolved in the context of disputes between business entities or 
between unions and employers. But the cases give no indication that 
the Court has ever stepped back and looked at the cumulative effect 
of its rulings, and at the mounting evidence on how mandatory 
arbitration of employee (and consumer) claims works in practice, to 
see whether it does indeed represent a fair quid pro quo relative to 
litigation. 
Ultimately, the proof is in the pudding—in the revealed 
preferences of those who are subject to MAAs. There is a kind of 
verdict on mandatory arbitration in the thousands of decisions that 
 
 131. Id. at 241. 
 132. Id. at 234–37 (majority opinion). 
 133. Id. at 236–37. 
 134. See id. at 235. 
 135. 532 U.S. 105 (2001). 
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employees and their attorneys make about whether it is worth 
submitting a claim to arbitration versus simply abandoning it. For all 
but a relative handful of cases per year, the answer appears to be that 
it is just not worth it. Somehow the cumulative effect of the Court’s 
rulings, given the dominant power of employers to tweak and tilt the 
arbitration process to their liking, have made arbitration so 
inhospitable to claimants that they routinely give up their claims. 
A skeptic might respond: If MAAs did represent a virtual 
insurance policy against employment claims—and one that is free, no 
less—then why wouldn’t all employers impose such agreements? I 
fear that may be exactly where we are headed, albeit more slowly 
than one might have expected. And the lag in adoption of MAAs 
might be traceable to the obscurity surrounding mandatory 
arbitration and the long quest for reliable empirical data on its 
impact. 
As noted above, after Gilmer opened the door to mandatory 
arbitration of employment claims, some early data seemed to suggest 
that arbitration was a mixed bag for employers: It tended to produce 
more modest and predictable recoveries, but at the cost (to 
employers) of greater employee access to the forum and perhaps 
more claims reaching a hearing on the merits.136 Moreover, in the 
early days of mandatory arbitration it appeared that the lower courts 
were rising to the challenge of policing the fairness of MAAs, so that 
manifestly skewed arbitration procedures were likely to trigger 
litigation, and perhaps be invalidated.137 Many employers might 
sensibly have decided to take their chances in court, where they held 
familiar advantages. Others—especially small employers without 
regular access to sophisticated legal counsel—might simply not have 
learned about the arbitration option. 
But the arbitration landscape has changed with the Supreme 
Court’s drastic constriction of judicial oversight of arbitration and its 
presumptive green light to provisions that foreclose aggregate 
claims.138 Just since Italian Colors, the evidence suggests that 
employers have responded quickly and enthusiastically to the Court’s 
invitation to block group claims: A law firm survey found that 
employers’ usage of anti-class action provisions in MAAs rose from 
 
 136. See Estreicher et al., supra note 51 (manuscript at 7–8). 
 137. See, e.g., Michael Z. Green, Debunking the Myth of Employer Advantage from 
Using Mandatory Arbitration for Discrimination Claims, 31 RUTGERS U. L.J. 399, 429 
(2000). 
 138. “Presumptive” because the legality of such clauses in employment agreements 
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96 N.C. L. REV. 679 (2018) 
2018] MANDATORY ARBITRATION 707 
sixteen percent to nearly forty-three percent just from 2012 to 2014.139 
Although anti-class action provisions do not affect all employment 
claims, they can obliterate potentially costly group claims at the 
virtual stroke of a pen. So why not? That single advantage of 
arbitration might indeed be driving the dramatic expansion in the 
adoption of MAAs shown by Colvin’s recent survey data.140 
The appeal of mandatory arbitration for employers might be 
affected by the outcome in this term’s D.R. Horton cases. The shift to 
arbitration seems likely to accelerate if the Court reverses the NLRB 
and removes the last legal hurdle to employers’ use of MAAs to 
preclude aggregate claims. If the Court instead affirms the NLRB and 
bars that use of MAAs, some employers might have second thoughts 
about arbitration, and some employees will have access to 
mechanisms of collective adjudication, either in court or in 
arbitration. But emerging data on the miniscule number of 
arbitrations that are filed at all—the data that are highlighted here—
underscore the advantages of MAAs for employers even in individual 
cases, and might fuel the arbitration juggernaut for years to come. 
CONCLUSION 
The premise of Gilmer in the crucial domain of employment 
discrimination was that arbitration was merely an alternative forum—
more informal but comparably effective—for the vindication of 
statutory rights. But Gilmer took a leap of faith on that score, for at 
the time there was no evidence on how mandatory arbitration would 
actually work when designed by the more powerful party in the highly 
asymmetric employment relationship and imposed as a condition of 
initial or continued employment. The empirical evidence—or enough 
of it—is now in. It now appears that, by imposing mandatory 
arbitration on its employees, an employer can ensure that it will face 
only a miniscule chance of ever having to answer for future legal 
misconduct against employees. Such a provision amounts to a virtual 
ex ante waiver of substantive rights that the law declares non-
waivable. 
Already in 1996, Professor Katherine Stone described mandatory 
pre-dispute arbitration agreements as the modern equivalent of the 
pre-New Deal “yellow dog contracts” by which employees had to 
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agree not to join a union as a condition of employment: “Today’s 
‘yellow dog contracts’ require employees to waive their statutory 
rights in order to obtain employment.”141 At the time that conclusion 
might have seemed a bit hyperbolic. It was not foreordained that 
submission to arbitration would amount to a waiver of substantive 
rights. But that now appears to be the cumulative effect of the FAA 
jurisprudence on judicial oversight (or lack thereof) of the fairness of 
arbitration agreements. 
The erasure of substantive rights will be plain for all to see if the 
Court allows employers to use MAAs to ban aggregate actions, for 
that alone will sound a death knell to most wage and hour claims, and 
will confer virtual immunity on firms for those claims.142 But the data 
reviewed above show that MAAs function as a virtual death knell for 
most employment claims, including the many individual wrongful 
dismissal or harassment claims that are not amenable to collective 
adjudication and are unaffected by anti-aggregation provisions. The 
upshot of the Court’s nearly-unwavering insistence on deferring to 
the arbitration “agreement”—that is, to the employer who drafts the 
agreement and imposes it as a condition of employment—has been to 
swallow up most employment disputes on the way from “naming” and 
“blaming” to “claiming,” and before they take shape in a formal 
complaint. 
It is not clear, and this Article does not venture to say, what 
particular combination of changes to the doctrine, if any, could make 
mandatory arbitration reasonably hospitable to actual plaintiffs and 
their attorneys. Perhaps there is nothing that can be done to ensure 
the fairness of mandatory pre-dispute arbitration in the context of the 
highly asymmetric employment relationship. Or perhaps the efficacy 
of arbitration for claimants could be salvaged by the establishment of 
a clear set of minimum standards of fairness for both arbitration 
procedures and arbitration providers, with full compliance as a 
condition of enforceability.143 In any case, the Court’s FAA 
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 142. See generally Katherine V.W. Stone, Procedure, Substance, and Power: Collective 
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jurisprudence so far has done almost nothing to encourage such an 
effort. As things stand, the imposition of mandatory arbitration by 
employers amounts to a virtual cancellation of employee rights—an 
ex ante forced waiver of non-waivable rights. 
The FAA is a mere statute—albeit a miraculously muscled up 
statute. It is thus open to Congress to either reject the application of 
the FAA in some or all employment (and consumer) cases or to 
impose more rigorous standards of fairness in such cases. But in the 
face of congressional inaction, if not dysfunction, the fate of employee 
rights turns on the evolving views of mandatory arbitration in the 
Supreme Court. One might hope that the Court’s stubborn insistence 
(by the slimmest of margins) on routine enforcement of MAAs stems 
from a lag in empirical understanding of their impact on employee 
rights. Perhaps the judicial proponents of mandatory arbitration still 
hold the view that arbitration entails a fair tradeoff, and allows for the 
effective vindication of employee rights.144 In light of what we now 
know about the sheer paucity of arbitrations, however, that view can 
no longer stand. If the Court continues on its current pro-arbitration 
path in the face of this stark reality, it will be complicit in employers’ 
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